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NOTES
THE CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITS OF DISCOVERY
Discovery is an old tool of the legal profession,' the general consti-
tutionality of which cannot be seriously questioned.2 The modern trend
of reducing pleadings to the function of notice-giving has resulted in a
greatly expanded role for discovery. The federal rules are the foremost
example of the new importance of this procedure.3 The Supreme Court
has held that these rules are to be accorded a broad and liberal interpreta-
tion.4 Certain limitations, however, on this expansion are imposed by
the constitutional doctrines of self-incrimination, unreasonable search
and seizure, equal protection and due process. These doctrines impose
generally similar limitations on both state and federal procedures.
Self-Inzcrimination. The privilege against self-incrimination may
be invoked in any proceeding when the evidence sought would tend to
incriminate the person giving it.' Criminal liability can be imposed either
by criminal prosecutions or by civil actions' involving sanctions that are
penal in nature.' Distinguishing such a sanction from one imposing
1. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 515 (1947) (concurring opinion).
2. Tomlinson v. Tomlinson, 338 Mich. 274, 61 N.W.2d 102 (1953); Langan v.
First Trust & Deposit Co., 270 App. Div. 700, 62 N.Y.S.2d 440 (1946).
3. FED. R. Civ. P. 26-37.
4. 329 U.S. 495, 507 (1947).
5. The Fifth Amendment states that: "No person . . . shall be compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself. . . ." In a leading case, the government
contended that the privilege did not apply in civil proceedings. The Court said: "The
privilege is not ordinarily dependent upon the nature of the proceedings in which the
testimony is sought or is to be used. It applies alike to civil and criminal proceedings,
whenever the answer might tend to subject to criminal responsibility him who gives it."
McCarthy v. Arndstein, 266 U.S. 34, 40 (1924).
The Fifth Amendment does not apply directly to proceedings in state courts, Adam-
son v. California, 332 U.S. 46 (1947). State courts have interpreted similar provisions
in state constitutions in a manner analogous to the federal interpretation. See e.g., Mum-
ford v. Croft, 47 Del. 464, 93 A.2d 506 (1952) ; Wiener v. Wiener, 283 App. Div. 950,
130 N.Y.S.2d 212 (1954).
6. Bowles v. Trowbridge, 60 F. Supp. 48 (N.D. Cal. 1945); French v. Venneman,
14 Ind. 282 (1860) ; State v. Western Union, 336 Mich. 84, 57 N.W.2d 537 (1953);
State v. District Court, 128 Mont. 445, 277 P.2d 536 (1954).
7. The privilege is very limited when the answer would bring a person into dis-
repute but would not incriminate him, or when immunity against criminal prosecution is
granted. See Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591 (1896). State courts have held the same
way. Shrumpert v. Lee County, 153 Cal. App. 2d 162, 314 P.2d 135 (1957). Cf., Lessee
of Galbreath v. Eichleberger, 3 Yeates 515 (Pa. 1803).
The privilege does not attach if the matter on which the claim of privilege is based
is so old that the statute of limitations would have run. United States v. Costello, 222
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civil liabiltiy only is a difficult matter not yet settled by the courts.
Boyd v. United States established the principle that a discovery order
may be resisted when the sanction involved is criminal in effect and sub-
stance.8 In that case a statute provided for imprisonment, fine and for-
feiture of merchandise for bringing in goods without paying duty with
the intent to defraud the government. The action was brought under
another part of the statute as a civil proceeding to declare a forfeiture of
goods seized by the government. The Court, considering this an attempt
by the government to circumvent the constitutional safeguards of search
and seizure and self-incrimination, held the sanction penal to the extent
that these protections could be invoked, while not penal to the extent that
civil procedure would not apply generally.'
The Boyd principle is still valid, but its limits are not clear. In de-
termining whether a given sanction is penal the cases have turned on the
procedural rule involved,1" just as in the Boyd case. This is logical once
the premise is granted that some procedural rights are more important
than others, hence should be construed more liberally. It is difficult to
define the limits of the principle, however, for there are no later Supreme
Court cases turning on self-incrimination. 1 The reasoning in cases on
other points has been broad enough to provide some general guides.
F.2d 656 (2d Cir. 1955).- The matter might -still be such as to bring the party into dis-
repute, but this is not sufficient grounds for invoking the privilege.
Denying discovery on constitutional grounds is to be distinguished from a similar
rule in equity that was based on chancery practice. In the latter instances, discovery
would be denied if the sanction was a penalty or forfeiture, regardless of whether such
sanction was civil or criminal in nature. Wilson v. Union Tool Co., 275 Fed. 623 (S.D.
Cal. 1921) ; Tuskogee Homes Co. v. Oswalt, 248 Ala. 64, 26 So. 2d 865 (1946) ; Skinner
y. Judson, 8 Conn. 528 (1831) ; W.T. Raleigh Co. v. Hester, 190 Miss. 329, 200 So. 250
(1941).
8. 116 U.S. 616 (1886). Accord, Robson v. Doyle, 191 Ill. 566, 61 N.E. 435 (1901).
9. 116 U.S. 616, 634 (1886). See United States v. Wilson-Williams, Inc., 24
F.R.D. 468 (S.D.N.Y. 1959).
10. Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391, 400 n. 3 (1938). "The distinction here
taken between sanctions that are remedial and those that are punitive has not generally
been specifically enumerated. In determining whether particular rules of criminal pro-
cedure are applicable to civil actions to enforce sanctions, the cases have usually at-
tempted to distinguish between the type of procedural rule involved rather than the kind
of sanction being enforced. Thus Hepner v. United States, 213 U.S. 103, 111-112, hold-
ing that a verdict may be directed for the Government, and United States v. Regan, 232
U.S. 37, 50, holding that the Government need not prove its case beyond a reasonable
doubt, distinguished Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, and Lees v. United States, 150
U.S. 476, holding that the defendant could not be required to be a witness against him-
self on the ground that 'the guaranty in the Fifth Amendment to the Constitution
against compulsory self-incrimination . . . is of broader scope than are the guaranties
in Article III and the Sixth Amendment governing trials in criminal prosecution.' 232
U.S. at 50."
11. Lees v. United States, 150 U.S. 476 (1893), cited the Boyd case without dis-
cussing the problem.
NOTES
Hun tington v. Attrill" carefully considered the nature of a New
York statute imposing personal liability on stockholders of a corporation
until capital is paid in. In an often cited opinion the Court concluded that
the statute was civil in nature for conflict of laws purposes because it
gave the action to creditors of the corporation.
Penal laws, strictly and properly, are those imposing pun-
ishment for an offense committed against the State, and which
by the English and American constitutions, the executive of the
State has the power to pardon. Statutes giving a private action
against the wrongdoer are sometimes spoken of as penal in their
nature, but in such cases it has been pointed out that neither the
liability imposed nor the remedy given is strictly penal...
All damages for neglect or breach of duty operate to a
certain extent as punishment; but the distinction is that it is
prosecuted for the purpose of punishment, and to deter others
from offending in like manner. Here the plaintiff sets out the
liability of the town to repair, and an injury to himself from a
failure to perform that duty. The law gives him enhanced
damages; but still they are recoverable to his own use, and in
form and substance the suit calls for indemnity ...
The test whether a law is penal, in the strict and primary
sense, is whether the wrong sought to be redressed is a wrong to
the public, or a wrong to the individual. 13
This standard seemingly makes the privilege inapplicable in actions
brought by an aggrieved party. It is in accord with_ Boyd, for there the
Court objected to the government's bringing a civil action and thereby
circumventing the safeguards that apply in a criminal proceeding.
When the government has been the aggrieved party the Court has
been inclined to regard it as a private plaintiff, with emphasis on the
point that the extra damages would simply make the government whole.
In Helvering v. M'litchell"4 an action to recover a deficiency in income tax
payments, plus 50 per centum of the deficiency when it was due to fraud
with intent to evade payment of the tax, was held civil in nature for
double jeopardy considerations despite the fact that the defendant had
been acquitted of wilful evasion.
The remedial character of sanctions imposing additions to
a tax has been made clear by this Court in passing upon similar
12. 146 U.S. 657 (1892).
13. 146 U.S. 657, 667, 668 (1892).
14. 303 U.S. 391 (1938).
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legislation. They are provided primarily as a safeguard for the
protection of the revenue and to reimburse the Government for
the heavy expense of investigation and the loss resulting from
the taxpayer's fraud. 5
This case clearly "emphasized the line between civil, remedial ac-
tions brought primarily to protect the government from financial loss and
actions intended to authorize criminal punishment to vindicate public
justice."' 6 The Court cited Stockwell v. United States,17 which held,
without discussion, that a statute forfeiting all goods brought into this
country without payment of duty created a property right in those goods
in the government-a right enforceable by civil action. This case was
not mentioned in Boyd but the clear impact of the rule there was to se-
verely limit the earlier decision. By citing this earlier case the Court in
Mitchell would seem by implication to limit Boyd severely; to distinguish
it as a self-incrimination case 8 does little to offset this result.
United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess," which also involved the ques-
tion of double jeopardy, extended this distinction. The statute in ques-
tion made certain efforts to defraud the government a crime, punishable
by imprisonment and fine. Another section of this act provided a civil
action for the same conduct, the sanction being double the amount of
damages caused by the fraud, plus two thousand dollars and costs of the
suit. The act provided for a qui tam action, the private individual to
receive half the recovery. The sanction was held civil because the ma-
jority thought its purpose was primarily remedial, i.e., to make the gov-
ernment whole.
The breadth of the Boyd rule is now in doubt, although its basic
premise has not been repudiated. There is no real basis for believing
that the Court would have ruled differently in the cases discussed if self-
incrimination had been involved. If one assumes that the correct test
for a sanction is "whether its purpose is to punish an offense against the
public justice of the state, or to afford a private remedy to a person in-
jured by the wrongful act,"2 then Hess can be reconciled with Boyd. But
if, as the case seems to imply, the concept of "injured" is to be expanded,
the Boyd rule will be narrowed drastically.
The lower federal courts are in conflict as to the breadth of the
rule when raised specifically to resist discovery. The Emergency Price
15. Id. at 401.
16. United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537, 548 (1943).
17. 80 U.S. 531, 534 (1871).
18. Helvering v. Mitchell, 303 U.S. 391 (1938).
19. 317 U.S. 537 (1943).
20. Huntington v. Attrill, 146 U.S. 657, 673 (1892).
NOTES
Control Act of 194221 provided criminal sanctions for overcharges in
one section, while in another the party overcharged was given an action
for treble damages. If the action was not brought within thirty days the
Administrator was authorized to bring the suit and the injured party
would thereafter be barred from suing. In suits brought by the Admin-
istrator, the sanction was classified as civil because the government would
be damaged by the inflation resulting from higher prices,22 and because
the primary purpose of the sanction was to effectuate public policy rather
than to punish. 3 The rule was given effect in a district court, where, in
a similar situation, the sanction was found to be penal because its purpose
was to provide an additional method of punishing offenders rather than
to provide a civil right to a private person.2" The majority of the courts,
without giving a carefully reasoned opinion for doing so, have classed
such sanctions as civil, thereby greatly extending Mitchell and Hess.25
The privilege is not limited to civil actions wherein the nature of the
sanction to be imposed is criminal. When a defendant in a civil action
has been indicted, and the discovery sought would disclose evidence that
would be useful against him in the criminal action, it is clear that he may
invoke the privilege against self-incrimination to avoid discovery. 6 The
privilege against self-incrimination applies if the evidence sought "would
have furnished a link in the chain of evidence needed in a prosecution." 2r
The privilege should be available to resist discovery when a criminal ac-
tion is not pending, but might be brought. A statute such as the Emer-
gency Price Control Act, which provides for both civil and criminal en-
forcement procedures, presents the problem in its most graphic form. To
compel discovery when the criminal action could still be brought would
violate the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination, if the evi-
dence sought was within the privilege and would tend to incriminate.
Discovery cases holding that the privilege does not apply to proceedings
under this statute can be distinguished on the basis that the evidence
sought was not within the privilege,28 or that the issue was not raised
21. 56 Stat. 23 (1942), as amended, 58 Stat. 632 (1944).
22. Crary v. Porter, 157 F.2d 410 (8th Cir. 1946).
23. Amato v. Porter, 157 F.2d 719 (10th Cir. 1946). Such reasoning was rejected
in the Boyd case. See generally, Turner, The Self-Incrimination Privilege in Actions
Involving Gavernment Regulated Enterprises, 37 J. CRim. L., C. & P.S. 524 (1947).
24. Bowles v. Trowbridge, 60 F. Supp. 48 (N.D. Cal. 1945).
25. See, e.g., Woods v. Robb, 171 F.2d 539 (5th Cir. 1948). United States v. La
Fontaine, 12 F.R.D. 518 (D.R.I. 1952), cites a number of cases holding both ways and
discusses them briefly.
26. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Logsdon, 18 F.R.D. 57 (W.D. Ky. 1955); Paul
Harrigan & Sons, Inc. v. Enterprise Animal Oil Co., 14 F.R.D. 333 (E.D. Pa. 1953).
27. Blau v. United States, 340 U.S. 159 (1950).
28. Amato v. Porter, 157 F.2d 719 (10th Cir. 1946) ; Bowles v. Misle, 64 F. Supp.
835 (D. Neb. 1946); Bowles v. Seitz 62 F. Supp. 773 (W.D. Tenn. 1945).
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beyond the question of whether or not the sanction was penal in nature."9
The one case wherein the point was pressed held that the privilege would
apply." This result seems to be in accord with principles laid down by
the Supreme Court.3
Assuming a case wherein the sanction is penal in nature, or the de-
fendant has been indicted, one finds further limitations on the applica-
bility of the privilege. These limitations flow from two general rules
and their interactions: first, the protection of the self-incrimination priv-
ilege is personal and cannot be invoked to avoid giving evidence that
would tend to incriminate another ;32 second, corporations do not come
m ithin the protection of the privilege."3 Under either of these rules an
officer of a corporation cannot invoke the privilege on behalf of the cor-
poration.3 4 Even if corporate records might tend to incriminate the of-
ficer holding them, under Wilson v. United States, the privilege may not
be invoked for the protection of the officer.3" This ruling is based on the
premise that the records are held subject to the corporate duty.3" Sur-
29. Crary v. Porter, 157 F.2d 410 (8th Cir. 1946) ; Bowles v. Berard, 57 F. Supp.
94 (E.D.Wis. 1944).
Passing on other statutes, but similarly distinguishable, are: Woods v. Robb, 171
F.2d 539 (5th Cir. 1948) ; United States v. La Fontaine, 12 F.R.D. 518 (D.R.I. 1952);
United States v. Lewis, 10 F.R.D. 56 (D.N.J. 1950).
30. Bowles v. Trowbridge, 60 F. Supp. 48, 50 (N.D. Cal. 1945). "An action for
treble damages would not be a bar to a later criminal suit by the United States against
the defendant. It cannot be questioned that the defendant in such criminal action would
have the privilege of refusing to testify. Yet, if the privilege does not extend to the
present action, incriminating testimony might be elicited from defendant here which
would enable his conviction in a criminal case. If this be so, the protection guaranteed
by the Fifth Amendment would be an empty shell."
Accord, Hope v. Burns, 6 F.R.D. 556 (E.D. Ky. 1947); Mumford v. Croft, 47 Del.
464, 93 A.2d 506 (1952) ; French v. Venneman, 14 Ind. 282 (1860) ; State v. Dist. Court,
128 Mont. 445, 277 P.2d 536 (1954) ; Siegel v. Crawford, 266 App. Div. 878, 42 N.Y.S.2d
837 (1943); Wagner Iron Works v. Wagner, 4 Wis. 2d 228, 90 N.W.2d 110 (1958).
31. See, McCarthy v. Arndstein, 266 U.S. 34 (1924); Counselman v. Hitchcock,
142 U.S. 547 (1892) ; H. Wagner & Adler Co. v. Mali, 74 F.2d 666 (2d Cir. 1935).
32. Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1905); Village of Brookfield v. Pentis, 101
F.2d 516 (7th Cir. 1939); Taylor v. Ford Motor Co., 2 F.2d 473 (N.D. Ill. 1924);
Mumford v. Croft, 47 Del. 464, 93 A.2d 506 (1952) ; Compton v. International Harvester
Co., 297 Pa. 462, 147 Atl. 93 (1929). Cf., Application of House, 144 F. Supp. 95 (N. D.
Cal. 1956) (attorney may invoke privilege for client's records). But see United States
v. Boccuto, 175 F. Supp. 888 (D.N.J. 1959).
33. Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1905); Bausch Mach. Tool Co. v. Aluminum
Co. of America, 63 F.2d 778 (2d Cir. 1933); Ingram v. Boston & Maine R.R., 89 N.H.
277, 197 Atl. 822 (1938) ; James v. Hotel Gramatan, Inc., 251 App. Div. 748, 296 N.Y.
Supp. 73 (1937).
34. Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1905).
35. 221 U.S. 361 (1911). Accord, Ex parte Bott, 146 Ohio St. 511, 66 N.E.2d 918
(1946) ; Compton v. International Harvester Co., 297 Pa. 462, 147 Atl. 93 (1929).
36. This corporate duty attaches to the records even though one person owns all of
the corporate stock. Grant v. United States, 227 U.S. 74 (1913). Corporate records
retain their corporate nature even after the corporation has ceased to exist and the
xecords have been turned over as personal property to the persons claiming the privilege.
Wheeler v. United States, 226 U.S. 478 (1912).
NOTES
rendering of documents, however, is to be sharply distinguished from the
giving of testimony. A corporate officer may refuse to answer inter-
rogatories addressed to the corporation if the answers would tend to in-
criminate him personally."7 But a corporation may not thereby obtain
protection, for it would be incongruous to allow a corporation to appoint
as agent to answer a person who may invoke the privilege and thereby
secure it for the corporation."8 A corporation must appoint someone
who will answer-an attorney if necessary-or suffer being treated as
having refused to discover."
The general rule that the privilege against self-incrimination does
not attach to corporate documents has been extended in scope. The rule
was originally justified on the grounds that the government, in granting
a corporate charter, retained a visitorial power." United States v. White
extended the rule to cover an unincorporated labor union, justifying the
extension by the public necessity for effectively regulating the activities
of such organizations and limiting the privilege, where records are con-
cerned, to purely personal protection.4 ' This rationale would seem to ex-
tend to records of any organization whose interests can be distinguished
from the interests of the persons comprising it. It is necessary to make
37. United States v. 3963 Bottles, More or Less, 265 F.2d 332 (7th Cir. 1959).
38. Nor may a corporation avoid surrendering its records by handing them over
to its attorney so as to invoke the attorney-client privilege. Grant v. United States, 227
U.S. 74 (1913). Accord, La Fever v. Lefkowitz, 178 N.Y.S.2d 172 (Sup. Ct. 1958);
Davies v. Columbia Gas & Elec. Co., 68 N.E.2d 571 (Ohio C.P. 1938), af'd, 36 Ohio L.
Abs. 335, 68 N.E.2d 231 (Ct. App. 1939).
39. United States v. 3963 Bottles, More or Less, 265 F.2d 332 (7th Cir. 1959). In
a similar proceedings, a lower federal court has reached a different result. In Paul
Harrigan & Sons, Inc. v. Enterprise Animal Oil Co., 14 F.R.D. 333 (E.D. Pa. 1953),
all the officers of the defendant corporation had been personally indicted. The plain-
tiff's interrogatories dealt with matters touching on the criminal charge. The court
recognized that all the officers would be entitled to the privilege, so it ordered discovery
postponed until the criminal proceedings were terminated, reasoning that the constitu-
tional privilege was more important than the inconvenience caused the plaintiff.
40. "But the corporate form of business activity, with its chartered privileges,
raises a distinction when the authority of government demands the examination of
books. . . . It cannot resist production upon the ground of self-incrimination ...
This is involved in the reservation of the visitorial power of the State, and in the
authority of the National Government where the corporate activities are in the domain
subject to the powers of Congress." Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 382 (1911).
41. 322 U.S. 694 (1944). The case arose out of a grand jury investigation of a
labor union. The Court said at 322 U.S. 700: "But the absence of that fact [corporate
charter] as to a particular type of organization does not lessen the public necessity for
making reasonable regulation of its activities effective, nor does it confer upon such an
organization the purely personal privilege against self-incrimination. Basically, the
power to compel the production of the records of any organization whether it be in-
corporated or not, arises out of the inherent and necessary power of the federal and
state governments to enforce their laws, with the privilege against self-incrimination
being limited to its historic function of protecting only the natural individuals from
compulsory incrimination through his own testimony or personal records."
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this distinction because private records are within the privilege. 2 *Where
the line between personal and non-personal records will be drawn is not
entirely clear at this time. The interests of a corporation and its sole
stockholder are distinct, and the normal rule concerning corporate records
applies.4" Partnerships present the difficult problem. It has been held
that the interests in a small partnership are merged so that the documents
are within the privilege.4 The difficulty of using as a test the size of
the partnership for making the distinction is self-evident. The court in
United States v. Onassis45 held that the privilege was not applicable to the
records of a large partnership, reasoning that a personal privilege should
not be extended to business combinations. This provides a definitive
test but in turn raises a question as to the extent a constitutional protec-
tion should be restricted.
The distinction between surrendering documents and giving testi-
mony has resulted in the holding that an officer cannot be compelled to
disclose the whereabouts of organizational records if those records con-
tain information that might tend to incriminate him.46 A corporate of fi-
cer can be compelled, however, to identify the records he is surrendering,
42. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886) ; Blumberg v. United States, 222
F.2d 496 (5th Cir. 1955) (dicta) ; United States v. Guterma, 174 F. Supp. 581 (E.D.N.Y.
1959); Application of Daniels, 140 F. Supp. 322 (S.D.N.Y. 1956); Shaughnessy v.
Bacolus, 135 F. Supp. 15 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).
There seems to be a general assumption that private records are protected. This is
buttressed by Supreme Court dicta, as in United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694, 701
(1944). But, as shown by the textual discussion, the Supreme Court, since the Boyd
case, has found some grounds for holding in each case presented that the records are
not in the privilege. This raises a question as to the validity of the general statement
that private records are protected.
43. Grant v. United States, 227 U.S. 74 (1913).
44. In re Subpoena Duces Tecum, 81 F. Supp. 418 (N.D. Cal. 1958). The Anti-
trust Division of the Department of Justice subpoenaed one member, and the records, of
a small family partnership. In this way the government was endeavoring to get evidence
without granting immunity to all the partners at the same time. The Fifth Amendment
protection extended only to the partner subpoenaed, for the privilege is personal. See
note 16 supra. But the court held that this constituted a violation of the Fourth Amend-
ment rights of the other partners since in a small partnership the records are essentially
private in nature. Whether a large partnership would be so protected was left open.
See generally 8 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2259bb (Supp. 1957) ; Note, 11 RUTGERS L. Rv.
771 (1957).
45. 133 F. Supp. 327 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).
46. Curcio v. United States, 354 U.S. 118 (1957). "The compulsory production
of corporate or association records by their custodian is readily justifiable, even though
the custodian protests against it for personal reasons, because he does not own the
records and has no legally cognizable interest in them. However, forcing the custodian
to testify orally as to the whereabouts of the nonproduced records requires him to dis-
close the contents of his own mind. He might be compelled to convict himself out of
his own mouth. That is contrary to the spirit and letter of the Fifth Amendment." Id.
at 128. Accord, Brady v. O'Hare, 2 App. Div. 2d 436, 156 N.Y.S.2d 533 (1956). See
generally, Fraser, The Privilege Agahst Self-Incrimination As Applied to Custodiants
of Organizational Records, 33 WASH. L. REv. 435 (1958).
NOTES
because authentication is implicit in the production. 7
The rule that a person may not be compelled to produce his private
records, if doing so would tend to incriminate him, is subject to a signifi-
cant exception. That is, records required by law to be kept are not priv-
ileged. 8 This can, if pushed to logical extremes, replace the rule. Since
the rule in this instance is a constitutionally protected right, there is a
distinct need that limitations be placed on the permissable scope of the
exception."0
The field of bankruptcy presents another exception to the rule that
private papers are within the privilege. A bankrupt must turn his records
over to the trustee and cannot resist doing so on the ground that they
contain evidence that would tend to incriminate him," nor can he affix
conditions upon their use."' This results in the documents being outside
the privilege entirely, for once the trustee has them the bankrupt cannot
prevent their use in a criminal proceeding against himself." This excep-
tion is justified on the grounds that the records are part of the estate,
and in turning them over the bankrupt is simply surrendering property
he is no longer entitled to keep. This is considered distinct from giving
evidence, for a bankrupt cannot be compelled to give any testimony con-
cerning his assets if to do so would tend to incriminate him." Therefore
the privilege may be invoked to resist answering a request for admission
of facts. 2
The privilege against self-incrimination is lost if immunity is
47. United States v. Austin-Bagley Corp., 31 F.2d 229 (2d Cir. 1929).
48. Shapiro v. United States, 335 U.S. 1 (1948). For a list of state decisions, see
Id. at 18 n. 25, bringing up to date the list given in Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361
(1911). But see Mr. Justice Frankfurter's analysis of these cases in his dissenting
opinion.
49. The four dissenters in Shapiro v. United States, 335 U.S. 1 (1948) were acutely
aware of this need. Mr. Justice Frankfurter stated: "If records merely because re-
quired to be kept by law ipso facto become public records, we are indeed living in glass
houses. Virtually every major public law enactment-to say nothing of State and local
legislation-has record keeping provisions." Id. at 51. To distinguish between public
and private records he suggested: "To determine whether such records are truly public
records, i.e., are denuded of their essentially private significance, we have to take into
account their custody, their subject matter, and the use sought to be made of them."
Id. at 56. Accord, United States v. Ansani, 138 F. Supp. 451 (N.D. Ill. 1955). Cf. State
v. Pence, 173 Ind. 105, 89 N.E. 490 (1909), where the court narrowly interpreted a
statute, thereby allowing the privilege to apply to the production of records. See gen-
erally, Meltzer, Required Records, The McCarran Act, and the Privilege Against Self-
Incrimination, IS U. Cmi. L. REv. 687 (1951).
50. Matter of Harris, 221 U.S. 274 (1911).
51. Ex parte Fuller, 262 U.S. 91 (1923).
52. Johnson v. United States, 228 U.S. 457 (1913).
53. McCarthy v. Arndstein, 266 U.S. 34 (1924). The privilege was allowed even
though the penal law concerned made the concealment of assets by a bankrupt a crime.
54. it re Stein, 43 F. Supp. 845 (N.D. Ill. 1942).
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granted for the matters revealedY Rule 36(b) states that an admission
under that rule cannot be used in any other proceeding." It has been sug-
gested that this provision removes the defense of self-incrimination in re-
sisting an admission.57 This position seems clearly untenable in light of
the consistent holding that the immunity granted, if it is to be given ef-
fect, must be coextensive with the privilege. 8 Two district courts have
held, when the question was presented directly, that the provision does not
deprive a person of the constitutional privilege.59
Search and Seiszure. The right to be free from unreasonable searches
and seizures imposes a limitation on the expansion of discovery in rela-
tion to the forced production of documents. 0  Boyd v. United States
established that the right is applicable in civil as well as criminal cases,
holding that the essence of the protection can be violated by a forced pro-
duction as well as by a physical search and seizure.8' Since the protection
is only against unreasonable action, a definition which establishes a work-
able standard is needed. Probably the best statement of the standard
required by the Fourth Amendment is found in Hale v. Henkel.
We are also of the opinion that an order for the production
of books and papers may constitute an unreasonable search and
seizure within the Fourth Amendment. . . . Applying the test
of reasonableness to the present case, we think the subpoena
duces tecum is far too sweeping in its terms to be regarded as
55. Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547 (1892).
56. FED. R. Civ. P. 36, Admission of Facts and Genuineness of Documents. (b) Ef-
fect of Admission. Any admission made by a party pursuant to such request is for the
purpose of pending action only and neither constitutes an admission by him for any
other purpose nor may be used against him in any other proceeding.
57. Woods v. Robb, 171 F.2d 539 (5th Cir. 1948); United States v. La Fontaine,
12 F.R.D. 518 (D.R.I. 1952); United States v. Lewis, 10 F.R.D. 56 (D.N.J. 1950). In
each of these cases the main basis for denying the privilege was that the sanction claimed
to be penal was really civil. The comments on rule 36(b) were added apparently just
to bolster the decision.
58. Counselman v. Hitchcock, 142 U.S. 547 (1892) ; Hope v. Burns, 6 F.R.D. 556
(E.D. Ky. 1947).
59. United States v. Fishman, 15 F.R.D. 151 (S.D.N.Y. 1953) (court noted that
the plaintiff had correctly conceded the point) ; Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Logsdon,
18 F.R.D. 57 (W.D. Ky. 1955). Accord, Village of Brookfield v. Pentis, 101 F.2d 516
(7th Cir. 1939) (dicta),
That a private party can invoke an immunity statute so as to remove the privilege
from the other party is doubtful. H. Wagner & Adler Co. v. Mali, 74 F.2d 666 (2d Cir.
1935).
60. The Fourth Amendment states that: "The right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated. .... "
61. 116 U.S. 616, 634 (1886). "Though the proceeding in question is divested of
many of the aggravating incidents of actual search and seizure, yet, as before said, it
contains their substance and essence, and effects their substantial purpose."
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reasonable. . . . If the writ had required the production of all
the books, papers and documents found in the office of the
MacAndrews & Forbes Company, it would scarcely be more
universal in its operation, or more completely put a stop to the
business of that company .. . Doubtless many, if not all, of
these documents may ultimately be required, but some necessity
should be shown, either from an examination of the witnesses
orally, or from the known transactions of these companies with
other companies implicated, or some evidence of their materi-
ality produced, to justify an order for the production of such a
mass of papers. A general subpoena of this description is
equally indefensible as a search warrant would be if couched in
similar terms.62
Federal discovery rules recognize this limitation and meet it by re-
stricting the order to produce by the requirement of designation.63 There-
fore, federal cases decided under the rules turn on this point,64 rather
than the underlying constitutional issue.65 Discovery in state courts has
been generally limited by a similar requirement.66 The standard applied
62. 201 U.S. 76, 77 (1905). A similar standard applies to administrative investiga-
tions. Oklahoma Press Pub. Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186, 208 (1946).
63. "An objection has been made that the word 'designated' in rule 34 has been con-
strued with undue strictness in some district court cases so as to require great and im-
practicable specificity in the description of documents, papers, books, etc., sought to be
inspected. The Committee, however, believes that no amendment is needed, and that the
proper meaning of 'designated' as requiring specificity has already been delineated by the
Supreme Court." 28 U.S.C. App. (1958), Rule 34 Notes of Advisory Committee on
Amendments to Rules. For cases wherein adequate specificity was found, the Commit-
tee cited Brown v. United States, 276 U.S. 134 (1928) and Consolidated Rendering Co.
v. Vermont, 207 U.S. 541 (1908). In both of these cases production was resisted on the
basis of unreasonable search and seizure, among other grounds.
64. 28 U.S.C.A. Rule 34, n. 25 (1958), lists a large number of cases passing on the
question.
65. But see United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 26 F. Supp. 711 (S.D.N.Y.
1939). Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 633 (1886) tied the Fourth and Fifth
Amendments together. ". . . and compelling a man 'in a criminal case to be a witness
against himself,' which is condemned in the Fifth Amendment, throws light on the ques-
tion as to what is an 'unreasonable search and seizure' within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment." This position has been repudiated, Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1905),
and severely criticized, 8 WIG.oa, EvIDENCE § 2264 (3d ed. 1940). But it may still
have some validity. See Davis v. United States, 328 U.S. 582 (1946) ; It re Subpoena
Duces Tecum, 81 F. Supp. 418 (N.D.Cal. 1958). See generally, Corwin, The Supreme
Court's Construction of the Self-Incrimination Clause, 29 MICH. L. Rtv. 1, 191 (1930).
66. Adams v. Superior Court, 49 Cal. 2d 427, 317 P.2d 983 (1957) ; Lester v. Illi-
nois, 150 Ill. 408, 23 N.E. 387 (1894).
It has been held that pre-trial interrogatories respecting the existence and amount
of liability insurance do not constitute an unreasonable search and seizure. Demaree v.
Superior Court, 10 Cal. 2d 99, 73 P.2d 604 (1937); People v. Fisher, 12 Ill. 2d 231,
145 N.W.2d 588 (1957).
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
seems to be that set forth in Hale v. Henkel.6" Unlike the privilege
against self-incrimination, the right against unreasonable search and
seizure protects corporations as well as individuals."8
Due Process and Equal Protection. Rather than being a limitation
on discovery itself, the equal protection provision of the Fourteenth
Amendment operates to require a reasonable basis for classification with-
in the rules or statutes establishing discovery procedure, or in their par-
ticular application. Under this requirement an entire statute, or section
thereof, can be invalidated. The discovery cases have applied general
constitutional law doctrines.69
Due process is such a broad concept of constitutional law that it
could probably be used to invalidate any unreasonable and oppressive dis-
covery order."0 Thus a sweeping order for the production of all of the
defendant's records might be held to violate due process, although a more
67. Union Trust Co. v. Superior Court, 11 Cal. 2d 449, 81 P.2d 150 (1938) ; Trans-
bay Const. Co. v. Superior Court, 12 Cal. App. 2d 570, 55 P.2d 1239 (1936) ; Pullman,
Salz & Co. v. Superior Court, 15 Cal. App. 276, 114 Fac. 589 (1911) ; Carden v. Ens-
minger, 329 Ill. 612, 161 N.E. 137 (1928); Swedish-Amer. Tel. Co. v. Casualty Co., 208
Ill. 562, 70 N.E. 768 (1904) ; Neufeld v. Jordon, 240 Iowa 1063, 38 N.W.2d 601 (1949) ;
Iowa Loan & Trust Co. v. District Court, 149 Iowa 66, 127 NAV. 1114 (1910); Anti-
Kalsimine Co. v. Adsit, 120 Mich. 250, 79 N.W. 186 (1899); State v. Ward, 351 Mo.
761, 173 S.W.2d 920 (1943) ; State v. Sartorius, 351 Mo. 111, 171 S.W.2d 569 (1943) ;
State v. District Court, 114 Mont. 128, 133 P.2d 350 (1943) ; State v. District Court, 27
Mont. 441, 71 Pac. 602 (1903); Boykin v. Hermitage Cotton Mills, 180 S.C. 364, 185
S.E. 863 (1936) ; Evans v. Evans, 98 Utah 189, 98 P.2d 703 (1940).
Contra, Matter of Mohawk Overall Co., 210 N.Y. 474, 104 N.E. 925 (1914).
68. Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920) ; Kullman, Salz
& Co. v. Superior Court, 15 Cal. App. 276, 114 Pac. 589 (1911).
69. A regulatory statute, and the discovery procedure therein provided, which
applied to foreign corporations but which would probably be invalid if applied to non-
resident individuals, was upheld on the basis that the wider scope of power which a state
possesses over foreign corporations in and of itself provides a sufficient grounds for the
classification adopted. Hammond Packing Co. v. Arkansas, 212 U.S. 233 (1909). A
deposition statute applicable in only one county of a state has been upheld. Ex parte
Hanna, 267 Ala. 527, 103 So. 2d 720 (1958). There is no reasonable basis for dis-
tinguishing between individuals and corporations in classifying what former assignors,
agents or employees could be examined in a discovery procedure. Phipps v. Wisconsin
Cent. Ry. Co., 133 Wis. 153, 113 N.W. 456 (1907). A statute providing that a foreign
corporation could be ordered to submit to a discovery examination without service of
process while requiring that non-resident individuals could be examined only if served
within the state is invalid. Kentucky Co. v. Paramount Exch., 262 U.S. 544, 551 (1923).
On the same basis, a statute that distinguished between residents and non-residents as to
the place where a discovery examination might be ordered held, was found to be based
on an unreasonable classification. State ex rel. McKee v. Breidenbach, 246 Wis. 513, 17
N.W.2d 554 (1945).
70. In dicta, the court in Sonken-Galamba v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. Co., 30 F.
Supp. 936 (W.D. Mo. 1939), said that an order subjecting a defendant to great cost
before there is a judgment against him would violate the Fifth Amendment. In Byers
Theatres, Inc. v. Murphy, 1 F.R.D. 286 (W.D., Va. 1940), the court suggested that to
require a party to incur expense greater than ordinarily incident to the prosecution or
defense of a suit would violate the Fifth Amendment.
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careful analysis would result in an invalidation of the order because it
constituted an unreasonable search and seizure. Broad attacks on general
areas of discovery, such as inspection of premises,7' or physical examina-
tions,7 " based on alleged due process violations, have failed.
The requirements of due process place a limitation on the sanctions
that may be imposed on a party that refuses to discover when ordered to
do so. The existence of this limitation was established in Hovey v. El-
liott, which held that punishing a party for refusal to obey a court order
by denying that party a further hearing violated due process.73 Hammond
Packing Co. v. Arkaisas established the standard under which sanctions
may be imposed by holding that a refusal to comply with a discovery
order gives rise to a presumption of bad faith and untruth in the answer.7"
This presumption justifies striking the portion of the answer to which
it applies.71
The Hovey limitation, which applies to both state and federal pro-
ceedings under the fourteenth and fifth amendments, can severely restrict
the effect which may be given to a refusal to discover. Thus, where the
discovery desired pertained only to the value of the shares of stock in-
volved in the controversy, the defendant's refusal to discover gave rise
only to the presumption that the stock was of the value that the plaintiff
71. Montana Co. v. St. Louis Mining & Milling Co., 152 U.S. 160 (1894).
72. Sibbach v. Wilson & Co., 312 U.S. 1 (1940) ; Camden v. Suburban Ry. Co., 177
U.S. 172 (1900).
73. 167 U.S. 409, 413 (1897). "The fundamental concept of a court of justice is
condemnation only after hearing. To say that courts have inherent power to deny all
right to defend an action, and to render decrees without any hearing whatsoever, is, in
the very nature of things, to convert the court exercising such an authority into an in-
strument of wrong and suppression, and hence to strip it of that attribute of justice up-
on which the exercise of judicial power necessarily depends."
74. 212 U.S. 322 (1909).
75. "Hovey v. Elliott involved a denial of all right to defend as a mere punishment.
This case presents a failure by the defendant to produce what we must assume was ma-
terial evidence in its possession, and a resulting striking out of an answer and a default.
The proceeding here taken may therefore find its sanction in the undoubted right of the
lawmaking power to create a presumption of fact as to the bad faith and untruth of an
answer to be gotten from the suppression or failure to produce the proof ordered, when
such proof concerned the rightful decision of the cause. In a sense, of course, the strik-
ing out of the answer and default was a punishment, but it was only remotely so, as the
generating source of the power was the right to create a presumption flowing from the
failure to produce." Hammond Packing Co. v. Arkansas, 212 U.S. 322, 350 (1909).
This standard was incorporated into FED. R. Civ. P. 37. "The provisions of this rule
authorizing orders establishing facts or excluding evidence or striking pleadings, or
authorizing judgments of dismissal or default, for refusal to answer questions or permit
inspection or otherwise make discovery, are in accord with Hammond Packing Co. v.
Arkansas . . . [212 U.S. 322 (1909)] . . . which distinguishes between the justifiable
use of such measures as a means of compelling the production of evidence, and their un-
justifiable use, as in Hovey v. Elliott . . . [167 U.S. 409 (1897)] . . . for the mere
purpose of punishing for contempt." 28 U.S.C. App. (1958), Rule 37, Notes of Advi-
sory Committee on Rules.
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had alleged. The plaintiff would still have to prove the "rest of his case,
and the defendant could not be barred from defending against it."0
Where, however, the only issue is the amount of damages, if the defend-
ant refuses to discover the court may strike the answer and give judgment
for the plaintiff for the amount alleged without violating due process.7
The plaintiff will not be ordered to go forward with proof of damages
since the records in the defendant's possession are the only means by
which the amount can be proven. Consequently, a plaintiff may be re-
lieved of his burden only when the conduct of the defendant makes a
hearing futile."
Under the Hovey doctrine, then, there are two separate limitations.
The first is that a refusal to discover only affects those matters sought
to be disclosed by the discovery order. The usual manner of enforcing
the order would be to deny the defendant an opportunity to introduce
evidence on that particular point. He would not be precluded, however,
from contesting other issues in the case. 9 The second limitation is that
the plaintiff must still prove his case as well as he can without the evi-
dence sought in the discovery order.8"
These limitations seem to apply only when a defendant refuses to
discover. If a plaintiff refuses to give a deposition, a federal court may
hold his appeal from dismissal of the case to be "frivolous."'" Dismissal
may also be ordered when the plaintiff resists discovery on the grounds
of self-incrimination."2 The Supreme Court has suggested that due
process may be violated by dismissing the action of a plaintiff who has
made a good faith effort to discover but who has been prevented from
completely doing so by the laws of another country.83 It is suggested
that the case, by limiting its reservation to plaintiffs who have tried to
comply, lends support to the proposition that the Hovey limitations do
not apply in plaintiff situations. For if the role of the parties were
reversed, striking the defense would clearly have violated due process.
76. Feingold v. Walworth Bros., 238 N.Y. 446, 144 N.E. 675 (1924).
77. Bova v. Roanoke Oil Co., 180 Va. 332, 23 S.E.2d 347 (1942).
78. People v. Henriques & Co., 267 N.Y. 398, 196 N.E. 304 (1935).
79. Fisher v. Underwriters at Lloyd's London, 115 F.2d 641 (7th Cir. 1940) ; Knox
v. Long, 152 Tex. 291, 257 S.W.2d 289 (1953). But see Miles v. Armour, 239 Mo. 438,
144 S.W. 424 (1912).
80. Michigan Window Cleaning Co. v. Martino, 173 F.2d 466 (6th Cir. 1949).
81. Collins v. Wayland, 139 F.2d 677 (9th Cir. 1944).
82. Levine v. Bornstein, 7 App. Div. 2d 995, 183 N.Y.S.2d 868 (1959). Where a
defendant successfully resisted discovery on the basis of the privilege, it has been held
that this did not thereby enable the plaintiff to avoid discovery. Wagner Iron Works v.
Wagner, 4 Wis. 2d 228, 90 N.W.2d 110 (1958).
83. Societe International, etc. v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197 (1958). See generally,
Note, 107 U. PA. L. REv. 426 (1959).
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